Iowa is 18-30 in games decided by 4 points or less





homes said:
While I like the analogy, I just can't see Ferentz playing poker.
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If you will allow me to run with the analogy a bit here, I think this has been one of the problems. Ferentz learned as a coach in an era when coaches were playing chess. Careful positioning, feeling the opponent out, don't make the fatal mistake, and ultimately out-maneuver them in the end. Ferentz and his staff were very good at this early on. They typically played better in the second half than the first and always seemed to make great adjustments.

Modern coaches don't play chess, they play poker. They are no longer afraid of the fatal mistake because they don't look at the game as a single chess match. Instead, it is a series of 80 poker hands. You might lose some big (turnovers, ugly 3-and-outs, giving up big plays on D), but you will also win some big (forcing turnovers/tackles-for-loss, big plays on offense). If you are aggressive in a calculated manner (and your calculations are correct), you will win more than you lose, and ultimately end the game with more money than you started (or more points on the scoreboard).

While chess is a fine game, you cannot play chess against someone who is playing poker. Coaches/teams used to (many still do) ****** plays so that they can see how the defense is going to react to different formations/actions. That has less value now because the defense is more likely to not even be reacting to the offense, but rather trying to dictate things themselves through aggressive schemes. And these schemes are so multiple that you cannot really get a pattern on them.

These schemes lack the fundamental rigor of "old school" football, but they create chaos. They create the opportunity for the offense to register big plays, but they also create a higher likelihood of a drive-killer or turnover. To combat this, you have to be able to score when the D is not fundamentally sound, you cannot just be satisfied with a 10 yard gain or a 1st down. Eventually the drive-killer/turnover is going to come if you have to execute too many plays to get to the end zone. Thus, you need to take more chances on offense.

This is just the same thing other people have been saying fit into this analogy, but I thought it interesting that others mentioned the poker analogy when I had been thinking the same thing myself.
 


CP87 said:
If you will allow me to run with the analogy a bit here, I think this has been one of the problems. Ferentz learned as a coach in an era when coaches were playing chess. Careful positioning, feeling the opponent out, don't make the fatal mistake, and ultimately out-maneuver them in the end. Ferentz and his staff were very good at this early on. They typically played better in the second half than the first and always seemed to make great adjustments.

Modern coaches don't play chess, they play poker. They are no longer afraid of the fatal mistake because they don't look at the game as a single chess match. Instead, it is a series of 80 poker hands. You might lose some big (turnovers, ugly 3-and-outs, giving up big plays on D), but you will also win some big (forcing turnovers/tackles-for-loss, big plays on offense). If you are aggressive in a calculated manner (and your calculations are correct), you will win more than you lose, and ultimately end the game with more money than you started (or more points on the scoreboard).

While chess is a fine game, you cannot play chess against someone who is playing poker. Coaches/teams used to (many still do) ****** plays so that they can see how the defense is going to react to different formations/actions. That has less value now because the defense is more likely to not even be reacting to the offense, but rather trying to dictate things themselves through aggressive schemes. And these schemes are so multiple that you cannot really get a pattern on them.

These schemes lack the fundamental rigor of "old school" football, but they create chaos. They create the opportunity for the offense to register big plays, but they also create a higher likelihood of a drive-killer or turnover. To combat this, you have to be able to score when the D is not fundamentally sound, you cannot just be satisfied with a 10 yard gain or a 1st down. Eventually the drive-killer/turnover is going to come if you have to execute too many plays to get to the end zone. Thus, you need to take more chances on offense.

This is just the same thing other people have been saying fit into this analogy, but I thought it interesting that others mentioned the poker analogy when I had been thinking the same thing myself.
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And I thought your posts that disagreed with me were good. The ones that agree with me are even better. :)
 


Kirk has a "live to fight another day" mentallity. He would give up a 70% chance to put the game away if it mean there was a 30% chance to lose right there. I remember the bowl game against Florida where we got screwed over bad by the refs (what's up Nick), we were down 2 scores with about 5 minutes left and punted. In that situation, if you go for it and don't get it, the game is over right there. If you punt, you probably cut in half any small chance you have of winning but at least the game isn't over yet. You live to fight another day, even though your chance to win that fight just got cut in half or worse. Turns out they fumbled the punt and we almost won. But a lucky play doesn't changed the fact that you hurt your team's chances because you wanted to live to fight another day.
 


Another example of living to fight another day is OSU in '09. Anybody who knows anything about football with tell you that at the 30 yard line with a little over a minute left, the offense has a huge advantage over the defense. To prove this point, ask yourselves this. In that situation, would you feel more comfortable if your offense was on the field or your defense was on the field. Given the choice, no one would put their defense out there willingly in that situation. Kirk gave up that huge advantage (1 offensive possession vs zero) to live to fight another day and have 1 offensive possession vs 1 offensive possession.
 


CP87 said:
What makes you think it was luck? It was not one lucky signing (ala Cam Newton) that single-handedly elevated the team. It was three straight years of quality players top to bottom. How does one "luck" into that?

The coach is responsible for the entire product. When the product is mediocre, as it has been for the last decade, are you willing to give him a break and say it was just bad luck? I would guess no. So why are you so quick to take his early success and just dismiss it? Can you think of 1 bad coach who has finished in the top 10 multiple times?
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Ill give him credit for having a very good eye for talent. That being said there was clearly a large element of luck with some of the players like Sanders and Clark.

Ill give him credit for hiring a very good staff. When you have Philbin, Norm Parker, Ron Aiken and Brett Bielema on staff your going to win. And KOK probably played a bigger role keeping Kirks stubbornness and eccentricities in check than we realize.

I'll give him credit for being an excellent offensive line teacher.

The thing is Kirk has one way of approaching football and at that time his particular methods were new to college. Zone blocking and Tampa two style D. opponents had not seen it before and this style also made much more sense in an old school smash mouth conference setting.

At that time all those strengths came together to out weigh the weaknesses. But 3 outlier years out of 15 seems to indicate there were allot of variables in play that may have effected the outcome.
 


So, to summarize ... somewhere around 2005, the game started to evolve toward aggressive offense. Kirk Ferentz 2000 didn't evolve and has since been left in the dust.

His strategy is like bringing a knife to a gunfight -- it imposes a higher degree of difficulty to overcome the inherent disadvantage. He can continue to develop all the average guys into good guys he wants but, unless he has above average to great guys (2009) his strategy is inherently overmatched by today's game.

Yup, been saying this as long as he's been running head first into 9-man boxes and checking into stretch plays to the short side of the field. It's an easily defendable and inherently challenging strategy that loses more often than wins.

At some point derKirkFer has to realize his tell and bring a bigger weapon in the form of talent, timely strategy and / or scheme.

It's simply not going to happen.
 


homes said:
During the Ferentz era. That's a 43% winning percentage. From 2010-2014, it's dropped to 7-14, a 33% winning percentage. There have been some particularly frustrating ones along the way. 2005 - losing to NW 28-27. In 2009 - losing to OSU 27-24. In 2010 - losing to Wisconsin 31-30, to NW 21-17 and to OSU 20-17. And, the 5 times the Hawks have lost to ISU by 4 or less.

To be fair, there have been some good ones, too. 2000 - beating PSU 26-23 in OT. 2003 - beating Michigan 30-27. 2007 - Beating ranked Illinois 10-6. 2009- beating MSU 15-13. 2013 - Beating Michigan 24-21. But, overall, as the record reflects, there have been too many disappointments.

Each year is different, obviously, but you can draw your own conclusions as to whether Iowa has played well enough to be in this many ball games, or they have underperformed and not won games they should have put away.
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So many ways to slice and dice this era.
 






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