Add Fry examples: Let's talk risk/reward decisions in football with examples

uihawk82

Well-Known Member
I think this could be an interesting and fun thread asking you to say what types of situations in games would be low or high risk/reward type decisions and how you would handle them. There has been a lot of talk about going for 2, going on fourth down, blitzing or playing base Dee. And also based on all aspects of game situations please give examples. I go first.

I think it was the crappy 2012 season and the hawks were at Indiana. Not much time in the game, maybe a few minutes and the hawks were behind by a FG. Ball on about the hawk 29 yard line, 4th and 1 and Iowa ball. KF punts but I was yelling to go for it. Why? If you remember the hawk offense struggle that season after both O tackles went down. But I thought the percentages of getting a yard were better than punting, stopping IU, and getting the ball back roughly at about the same spot on the field and driving 50 yards for at least a tying FG. I just looked it up and the score was 24-21 IU at the time. Iowa had 1 or 2 timeouts so if Iowa punts they cant give up a first down to IU.

What happened, Iowa punted, IU ran a couple of plays and got the first down and game over.

My reasoning is just that go on 4th down and if you make it you are in 4 down mode all the way.

And the other part of the risk reward situation is this, if the hawks go for it and dont get the 1st down yet hold IU to a late FG try with a minute or so to go Iowa would get the ball back either on a FG miss or on the ensuing kickoff. The hawks would still be down either 3 or 6 and have a slim chance to win.

Let's see what your risk/reward decision examples are and it doesnt have to be an example from a hawk game.
 
I think this could be an interesting and fun thread asking you to say what types of situations in games would be low or high risk/reward type decisions and how you would handle them. There has been a lot of talk about going for 2, going on fourth down, blitzing or playing base Dee. And also based on all aspects of game situations please give examples. I go first.

I think it was the crappy 2012 season and the hawks were at Indiana. Not much time in the game, maybe a few minutes and the hawks were behind by a FG. Ball on about the hawk 29 yard line, 4th and 1 and Iowa ball. KF punts but I was yelling to go for it. Why? If you remember the hawk offense struggle that season after both O tackles went down. But I thought the percentages of getting a yard were better than punting, stopping IU, and getting the ball back roughly at about the same spot on the field and driving 50 yards for at least a tying FG. I just looked it up and the score was 24-21 IU at the time. Iowa had 1 or 2 timeouts so if Iowa punts they cant give up a first down to IU.

What happened, Iowa punted, IU ran a couple of plays and got the first down and game over.

My reasoning is just that go on 4th down and if you make it you are in 4 down mode all the way.

And the other part of the risk reward situation is this, if the hawks go for it and dont get the 1st down yet hold IU to a late FG try with a minute or so to go Iowa would get the ball back either on a FG miss or on the ensuing kickoff. The hawks would still be down either 3 or 6 and have a slim chance to win.

Let's see what your risk/reward decision examples are and it doesnt have to be an example from a hawk game.

I thought it was a bad risk/reward to go cover zero against PSU on that long Trace McSorley TD run. PSU lives and dies on big plays and it's playing right into their hands. Now, that would have been OK if it were the Purdue scenario late in the 4th quarter. In that case, we either need to stop them right away or allow them to score right away, especially when they only need a field goal. We can't allow them to mosey down the field to field goal range and milk the clock. If they needed a TD that would be different.
 
The Florida bowl game we got screwed in. We were down 2 scores, had a 4th down in our own territory with 4 minutes left or so and punted the ball. Just a crazy stupid decision. At that point, you're pretty much saying the odds of getting an inside kick later is better than your odds of converting the 4th down since you will certainly need one at that point. The ironic part is they fumbled the punt and we got the ball.

Decisions like that happen for one reason and one reason only. Coaches are more concerned about prolonging the point of having a 0% chance of winning way more than they are concerned about giving themselves the best chance to win. Not getting the 1st down there meant we would have a 0% chance (basically). Punting prolongs the 0% chance even tho it cripples any hope you have. That decision always bugged my because it summed up Kirk in a nutshell. Maybe that's why I love aggressive Kirk so much now.
 
More conservative Kirk. Horseshoe in '09. Kirk decided the risk of losing in regulation wasnt worth the reward of making it to OT. The only problem is, he forgot there is no reward for making it to OT.

He decided if he went for the score, he had a small chance of losing in regulation which is way scarier than taking a knee and eliminating any possibility of losing in regulation.

What he should have been thinking about is his odds of winning in regulation vs the odds of losing in regulation. Anyone who has ever watched football knows that when there is one and a half minutes left in a tie game, the team who has the ball has a way better chance to win than the team who doesn't. I've obviously seen games where there was a turnover, or the defense got a stop and quick score, but I've seen 3 times as many games where the team with the ball drove down and scored at the end. It was such a huge advantage given away just for the false security of making it to OT.
 
More conservative Kirk. Horseshoe in '09. Kirk decided the risk of losing in regulation wasnt worth the reward of making it to OT. The only problem is, he forgot there is no reward for making it to OT.

He decided if he went for the score, he had a small chance of losing in regulation which is way scarier than taking a knee and eliminating any possibility of losing in regulation.

What he should have been thinking about is his odds of winning in regulation vs the odds of losing in regulation. Anyone who has ever watched football knows that when there is one and a half minutes left in a tie game, the team who has the ball has a way better chance to win than the team who doesn't. I've obviously seen games where there was a turnover, or the defense got a stop and quick score, but I've seen 3 times as many games where the team with the ball drove down and scored at the end. It was such a huge advantage given away just for the false security of making it to OT.
Yep, to compete at the highest levels you’ve got to know the odds in every situation and that should dictate your decisions. To ignore it, and pretend it isn’t an aspect of the game, gives someone else an advantage.
 
Yep, to compete at the highest levels you’ve got to know the odds in every situation and that should dictate your decisions. To ignore it, and pretend it isn’t an aspect of the game, gives someone else an advantage.

Kirk used to never care about odds, he only cared about safe. It sounds like (and looks like) he put a lot of effort on learning that part of the game. He even errors on the side of aggression now. I know people dont like his decision to go for 2, but it's not like it was a 70/30 or even a 60/40 decision. It was an extremely close call either way (I personally think going for 2 gives you a slightly better chance). After 20 years of conservative Kirk, no one should complain if he chooses the aggressive decision on a call that is so close. Now if he starts going for 4th downs from our own 20, then we should start complaining.
 
http://www.advancedfootballanalytics.com/index.php/home/research/game-strategy/120-4th-down-study

There are plenty of studies, I am sure, like the link I provided, that tell you when you should go for it.

Of course, so much depends on game situation, that I am guessing any decent modern coach would need a computer program, programmed and run by a numbers geek, that tells you what gives you the best chance of winning in each situation.

I would also guess that if the coach has such a program he is not going to tell the media what program they are using, especially if they paid or are paying a lot of money for that analysis.
 
http://www.advancedfootballanalytics.com/index.php/home/research/game-strategy/120-4th-down-study

There are plenty of studies, I am sure, like the link I provided, that tell you when you should go for it.

Of course, so much depends on game situation, that I am guessing any decent modern coach would need a computer program, programmed and run by a numbers geek, that tells you what gives you the best chance of winning in each situation.

I would also guess that if the coach has such a program he is not going to tell the media what program they are using, especially if they paid or are paying a lot of money for that analysis.

It's funny how people can think so differently than each other. My brain definitely works just like the guy's in the article (except I'm not as smart). I loved the part that lists the reasons that coaches dont choose the decision that is so much better. The "conventional decisions book" was made in a different era and coaches dont like to go against it because the heat will be on them instead of the players when it doesn't work. That and people tend to care about what they might lose more than they care about what they might gain. I basically said that in another thread earlier. So pretty much, chasing points is very beneficial in the win loss category, but not very smart if you dont want criticized.
 
You can spend all day crunching the numbers, stats, odds, etc., but I think there is also something to be gained by sending a message to your players that you have confidence in their ability to make a play and convert. Sometimes you just have to take a few chances, even if it goes against the odds.
 
You can spend all day crunching the numbers, stats, odds, etc., but I think there is also something to be gained by sending a message to your players that you have confidence in their ability to make a play and convert. Sometimes you just have to take a few chances, even if it goes against the odds.

I agree, as long as it doesn't go too much against the odds. I dont think you should go against the odds on a 75/25 decision for sure. But a 55/45 or even a 60/40 isn't a horrible idea occasionally. The 2 pt try was probably a 51/49 at worst. The people who care about that definitely put too much value into what could be lost and too little value in what could be gained.
 
I think this has been the one fundamental problem with Ferentz his entire coaching career. I think he is a great coach, and has put us in position to win huge games over and over again.

But where he falls short at times is being able to think clearly when the pressure really ratchets up and tough decisions need to be made quickly. I never thought he had the decision making ability that Hayden had in the big games.

I think a perfect example is the Penn State game this year. We have a first down at the 3 yard line very late in the game. Penn State was reeling, and in full panic mode. It was extremely loud at that end of the stadium. Why wouldn't you run the ball on first down at least, eat some clock and quiet the crowd? Instead, he chooses to pass the ball.....I thought that was a clear example of muddled thinking, and it really cost us big time.

Yet, sometimes the decisions really are good. Example, Iowa State this season. Late in the 4th quarter, slim 3 point lead we have a 3rd and 6, I believe. Ferentz chooses to throw the ball to Smith, who makes a great catch and takes it to ISU's two yard line. That call and that play won the game for us against a great team.
 
I think this has been the one fundamental problem with Ferentz his entire coaching career. I think he is a great coach, and has put us in position to win huge games over and over again.

But where he falls short at times is being able to think clearly when the pressure really ratchets up and tough decisions need to be made quickly. I never thought he had the decision making ability that Hayden had in the big games.

I think a perfect example is the Penn State game this year. We have a first down at the 3 yard line very late in the game. Penn State was reeling, and in full panic mode. It was extremely loud at that end of the stadium. Why wouldn't you run the ball on first down at least, eat some clock and quiet the crowd? Instead, he chooses to pass the ball.....I thought that was a clear example of muddled thinking, and it really cost us big time.

Yet, sometimes the decisions really are good. Example, Iowa State this season. Late in the 4th quarter, slim 3 point lead we have a 3rd and 6, I believe. Ferentz chooses to throw the ball to Smith, who makes a great catch and takes it to ISU's two yard line. That call and that play won the game for us against a great team.

You started out talking about Kirk's late game decision making but your two examples were play calls that Brian made. Kirk was even trying to call timeout when he saw what was going down against Penn State.
 
You started out talking about Kirk's late game decision making but your two examples were play calls that Brian made. Kirk was even trying to call timeout when he saw what was going down against Penn State.

that is true but Kirk is the head coach. He is responsible for the play calls of his son/assistant. And he didn't call the TO in time!!!
 
There's risk, and then there's the perception of risk. No better example than the infamous coach Kevin Kelley who went for it on nearly every 4th down and always onside kicks. The math actually backs him up, but the fear of giving up the ball in good field position affects the way people perceived it. As soon as a team takes advantage of it and scores the reaction is "SEE...it doesn't work"...when the reality is, it does when measured over time.

Kirk is a good example. He's been so averse to risk, that he'd rather forgo opportunities than take any risk. (he's obviously gotten better at this) Avoiding risk is an easier sell as it's fear-based. Envisioning the possible good outcome is tougher to sell people
 
that is true but Kirk is the head coach. He is responsible for the play calls of his son/assistant. And he didn't call the TO in time!!!

He's responsible for making sure he has a OC that calls a good game. I'm not sure he needs critiques or credited for each individual play. He sure doesnt get credit from me for deciding to throw to Smith on 3rd and 6. That was just a random play that happened to work.
 
Kirk going for it on 4th and long right before halftime vs. Penn St. was a case of being too overconfident in both the play and the ability of the defense to prevent PSU from going down and getting a FG right before halftime, which indeed happened.

Not only was it too overconfident but he and Brian were almost too enthralled with their new-found aggressiveness to even consider what might happen if it didn't work, considering the odds of converting on it was a small percentage.
 
There's risk, and then there's the perception of risk. No better example than the infamous coach Kevin Kelley who went for it on nearly every 4th down and always onside kicks. The math actually backs him up, but the fear of giving up the ball in good field position affects the way people perceived it. As soon as a team takes advantage of it and scores the reaction is "SEE...it doesn't work"...when the reality is, it does when measured over time.

Kirk is a good example. He's been so averse to risk, that he'd rather forgo opportunities than take any risk. (he's obviously gotten better at this) Avoiding risk is an easier sell as it's fear-based. Envisioning the possible good outcome is tougher to sell people

Is Kevin Kelley his name? I posted about his risk reward moves but I couldnt remember his name.

Yes if you have 13 possessions a game average and if you can keep two of them going for scores by going on 4th down and get another quick possession on one onside kick and get a TD that is 21 points you might not get in one game. Amazing.
 
People and I have mentioned Fry's risk reward thinking. I remember several games where near the end of the first half he would have the OC call a couple or one running play after getting the ball in their own territory, make it look like they were working the clock, then on 2nd or 3rd down he would call for a bomb. Did it against MSU and IU that i can remember and got FGs on the drives. There is some risk in a fumble hit on the QB or on an INT but they are low risks and if the INT.

At Hawaii one year on the opening drive that was many methodical plays Fry went on 4th and goal and they didnt get it. The risk part of it is 4th and short and also there is a lot of time in the game to make up for it if you dont get it but it can deflate and give mo to the other team. The reward part is to get the TD.
 
People and I have mentioned Fry's risk reward thinking. I remember several games where near the end of the first half he would have the OC call a couple or one running play after getting the ball in their own territory, make it look like they were working the clock, then on 2nd or 3rd down he would call for a bomb. Did it against MSU and IU that i can remember and got FGs on the drives. There is some risk in a fumble hit on the QB or on an INT but they are low risks and if the INT.

At Hawaii one year on the opening drive that was many methodical plays Fry went on 4th and goal and they didnt get it. The risk part of it is 4th and short and also there is a lot of time in the game to make up for it if you dont get it but it can deflate and give mo to the other team. The reward part is to get the TD.

I think your point about having a lot of time left to make up for it is a good reason the "don't go for 2 until you have to" doesn't make a lot of sense. In the game the other day, Purdue went down and scored putting us down 12 instead of 11. Going for it early could only help us there because we knew we needed 2 touchdowns. Had we been down 11, we would have no idea if we needed 2 touchdowns or a touchdown and a field goal because we wont know if we would even convert the 2 pt conversion until we try it. Once we do know, it may be too late. Imagine if we kick a field goal to go down 8 on our 2nd to last possession. Then score on our last, only to miss the 2 pointer. It turns out kicking the field goal was a waste of time. Something we wouldn't have done if we had already tried going for 2. Going for it early gives you the advantage of knowing what you need.

The part about killing momentum can be true tho. Its maybe time for a sideline speech after a missed 2 pt conversion to help keep momentum going.
 
Aggressive Kirk lowers success odds by conservatively putting the team in position to need to be aggressive.
 

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